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Abstract. In a range test, one party holds a ciphertext and needs to
test whether the message encrypted in the ciphertext is within a certain
interval range. In this paper, a range test protocol is proposed, where
the party holding the ciphertext asks another party holding the private
key of the encryption algorithm to help him. These two parties run the
protocol to implement the test. The test returns TRUE if and only if
the encrypted message is within the certain interval range. If the two
parties do not conspire, no information about the encrypted message is
revealed from the test except what can be deduced from the test result.
Advantages of the new protocol over the existing related techniques are
that it achieves correctness, soundness, flexibility, high efficiency and
privacy simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
In a range test, one party (the tester) holds a ciphertext and needs to test
whether the message encrypted in the ciphertext is within a certain interval
range. This test is frequently required in cryptographic applications like e-auction
[1, 15], electronic voting [3, 10, 11, 13], electronic finance [8], group signature [7],
publicly verifiable secret sharing [14] and verifiable encryption [2]. The following
properties are desired in a range test.
– Correctness: If the encrypted message is in the interval range, the test out-
puts TRUE.
– Soundness: If the test outputs TRUE, the encrypted message is in the interval
range.
– Privacy: No information about the encrypted message is revealed except
what can be deduced from the test result.
– Flexibility: The limitation on the range size, encryption format and partici-
pants should be as little as possible.
The simplest way to implement a range test is using multiple equality tests
linked by “OR” logic to test whether
the encrypted message equals the first number in the range ∨
the encrypted message equals the second number in the range ∨
. . . ∨ the encrypted message equals the last number in the range
without revealing the encrypted message equals which number in the range. This
method is called naive range test in this paper. Two special methods, zero knowl-
edge proof of “OR” logic by Cramer et al [9] or the verification technique called
zero test [17], can be employed to implement naive range test without compro-
mising privacy. These two methods can be flexibly employed so that various
ranges (e.g. ranges with very large size), participant models (with or without
prover) and encryption formats (even commitment formats) can be used. Al-
though naive range test can be flexible, correct, sound and private, it is very
inefficient as its cost is linear in the size of the range. If the ciphertext to test is
encrypted in some special encryption format (e.g. encrypted bit by bit), cost of
naive range test can be reduced to be linear in the logarithm of the range size.
However, ciphertext in practical cryptographic applications (especially when se-
cure computation of ciphertext is needed) cannot be often encrypted in special
encryption format. So for the sake of flexibility, naive range test generally needs
a cost linear in the size of the range. Even if the special encryption format can
be employed to improve efficiency, naive range test is still too inefficient.
Some cryptographic techniques [2, 5, 14, 6, 8] are related to range test. They
prove that a committed message is within a certain interval range and are called
RPC (range proof of commitment) schemes in this paper. In RPC schemes, a
prover with the knowledge of the committed message is needed to give a zero
knowledge proof that the message is in the certain interval range. Although RPC
schemes are efficient as their cost is independent of the size of the range, they
have some drawbacks. Firstly, in many applications like e-auction and e-voting,
encrypted messages instead of committed messages are required to be tested.
So RPC schemes (especially [5], which requires a certain commitment format)
cannot be employed in these applications. Secondly, the message to be tested
may be generated by multiple parties and unknown to anybody. For example, in
the kth-bid auction [1, 15], the seller has to test whether the number of bids at
a price is less than k without revealing the bids. As no single bidder knows the
sum, nobody can provide any proof to implement the test. In another example,
e-banking, it is required to test whether a sum of money is below a threshold
without revealing it while nobody knows the sum as it accumulates multiple
dealings. So a prover is not always available. Thirdly, most RPC schemes [2, 14,
6, 8] cannot guarantee correctness and soundness at the same time. The only
correct and sound scheme among them is Boudot [5], which is only asymptot-
ically (instead of absolutely) sound. Finally, all the known RPC schemes can
work only when the range to test is many magnitudes smaller than the size of
the message space of the commitment algorithm.
As the drawbacks of RPC schemes greatly reduce their reliability, flexibility
and limit their application, in many circumstances inefficient naive range test
has to be employed. So a range test protocol is proposed in this paper, which is
much more efficient than naive range test and overcomes the drawbacks of the
RPC schemes. In the new range test protocol, two parties are involved: a tester
and a (decryption) authority, who can be acted by multiple entities through a
threshold key sharing mechanism. The tester holds the ciphertext to test. The
private key to decrypt the ciphertext is held by the authority. So the tester asks
the authority for help and they run the protocol to implement the test. If the
encrypted message is in the certain interval range, the protocol outputs TRUE. If
the encrypted message is not in the certain interval range, the protocol outputs
FALSE. Namely, the new test protocol is correct and sound. If the two parties
do not conspire, no information about the encrypted message is revealed from
the test except what can be deduced from the test result. The new protocol is
flexible as it accepts ranges of the same magnitude as the size of the message
space of the encryption algorithm and does not need any prover with knowledge
of the encrypted message. The new protocol is efficient as its computational cost
is independent of the range size. This new protocol can overcome the drawbacks
of RPC schemes. In the example of kth-bid auction, the seller acts as the tester
while an auctioneer acts as the authority to help the seller to determine whether
the number of bids at a price is over k without revealing the bids or the number.
In the example of e-banking, two servers (neither knowing the sum of the money)
act as the tester and authority to test the range of the sum. If the two servers
do not conspire, the sum is not revealed.
Two different adversary models are used in this paper to analyse correct-
ness and soundness. In a negatively-malicious model, the adversary does not
deviate from the protocol in his attack. In an actively-malicious model, the ad-
versary may attack in any way including deviating from the protocol. Like all
the RPC schemes, this paper does not consider CCA (chosen ciphertext attack)
model when analysing privacy. As to our knowledge all the secure computation
schemes related to range test employ homomorphic encryption or commitment,
it is senseless to talk about CCA. Actually, only privacy in CPA (chosen plain-
text attack) model is achieved in this paper, while CCA privacy is left as an
open question.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Parameters and symbols to be used
in the paper are defined in Section 2. In Section 3, a building block, specialized
zero test, is designed. In Section 4, three range test protocols are proposed. They
are not independent. Instead, each protocol is an optimization of the previous
one.
2 Preliminary Work
Parameters, symbols and encryption systems to be used later are described in
this section. Two additive homomorphic semantically-secure encryption systems3
(e.g. modified ElGamal encryption [12, 13]) are needed in this paper. They are
called the first encryption system and the second encryption system respectively
later in this paper. The ciphertext to test is encrypted in the first encryption
system, while the tester holds the ciphertext and the authority holds the private
key of the first encryption system. To implement the range test, a second en-
cryption system is set up and its private key is also held by the private key. The
public keys of both encryption systems are public, so that both the authority
and the tester can use both encryption systems for encryption. The message
spaces of the two encryption systems are Zp1 and Zp2 respectively. It is required
in this paper that p2 ≥ 3p1 and p2 is a prime.
Although any additive homomorphic semantically-secure encryption algo-
rithm like Paillier encryption [16] can be employed in the first encryption system,
it is suggested to employ the modified ElGamal encryption [12, 13] in the second
encryption system so that p2 is a prime. For simplicity, the modified ElGamal
encryption is employed in both encryption systems in this paper. Details about
the two (modified ElGamal) encryption systems are as follows where index i
stands for the ith encryption system.
– p′i is the multiplicative modulus in the i
th encryption system.
– < gi > is a cyclic subgroup of Z
∗
p′
i
with generator gi, which has a prime order
pi.
– The message space in the ith encryption system is Zpi .
– xi ∈ Zpi is the private key in the i
th encryption system. (gi, yi) is the public
key in the ith encryption system where yi = g
xi
i mod p
′
i.
– Ei(m) stands for encryption of message m in the i
th encryption system:
(gri mod p
′
i, g
m
i y
r
i mod p
′
i) where r is randomly chosen from Zpi .
– The product of two ciphertexts c1 = (a1, b1) and c2 = (a2, b2) in the i
th
encryption system is (a1a2 mod p
′
i, b1b2 mod p
′
i). Inversion of a ciphertext
c = (a, b) in the ith encryption system is (a−1 mod p′i, b
−1 mod p′i). With
multiplication and inversion defined, definition of exponentiation and divi-
sion is automatically obtained.
– Di(c), decryption function of ciphertext c = (a, b) in the i
th encryption sys-
tem, is loggi b/a
xi . Although normally decryption in the modified ElGamal
encryption algorithm needs a logarithm search and is not efficient, it is only
required to test whether the message is zero or not in any decryption in this
paper, which does not need any logarithm search and is very efficient.
3 An encryption algorithm with message space Zp and decryption function D() is
additive homomorphic if D(c1) +D(c2) = D(c1c2) mod p for any ciphertexts c1 and
c2. An encryption algorithm is semantically-secure if given a ciphertext c and two
messages m1 and m2, such that c = E(mi) where i = 1 or 2, there is no polynomial
algorithm to find out i.
Later in this paper, encryption, decryption, ciphertext multiplication, cipher-
text inversion and ciphertext exponentiations are computed as described here in
this section. The other symbols to be used in this paper are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Symbols
% modulus computation
|a| the absolute value of an integer a
[S] the size of a set S(
a
b
)
the number of possible choices of b elements from a candidate elements
3 A Building Block — Specialized Zero Test
Zero test is a technique to test whether there is at least one null ciphertext
(encryption of zero) among multiple ciphertexts. A zero test must be private,
namely nothing about the messages encrypted in the ciphertexts can be deduced
from the test except whether there is at least one null ciphertext among them.
The existing zero test technique (e.g. the so-called complex zero test in [17] or
similar technique in [4]) cannot obtain complete privacy as it may reveal some
information about the number of null ciphertexts. Fortunately, in this paper it
is only desired to test whether there is one null ciphertext among multiple ci-
phertexts where there is at most one null ciphertext among them. This will be
accomplished by modifying the zero test technique from [17] into a new cryp-
tographic primitive: specialized zero test, which can achieve complete privacy in
the application in this paper. A specialized zero test examines whether there is
one null ciphertext among multiple ciphertexts encrypted using the second en-
cryption system described in Section 2 where there is at most one null ciphertext
among them. While the zero test technique in [17] is a multiparty protocol, only
two parties are involved in the specialized zero test in this paper: a tester A1
and an authority A2. A1 holds ciphertexts c1, c2, . . . , cn in the second encryp-
tion system where there is at most one null ciphertext among them. A2 holds
the private key of the second encryption system. In the specialized zero test A2
assists A1 to test whether there is one null ciphertext among c1, c2, . . . , cn. Three
properties are desired in specialized zero test.
– Correctness: if there is one null ciphertext in c1, c2, . . . , cn, the test result is
TRUE.
– Soundness: if the test result is TRUE, there is one null ciphertext in c1, c2, . . . , cn.
– Privacy: after the test, each party learns only the test result and what can
be deduced from it, as long as the authority and the tester do not collude.
The test protocol is denoted as ZM ( A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn ) and described in
Figure 1.
1. A1 chooses pi(), a permutation on {1, 2, . . . , n}, and random integers ri from
Zp2 − {0} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then he calculates c
′
i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. He
sends c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n to A2.
2. A2 calculates di = D2(c
′
i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n one by one until one di is found to
be zero or all the n ciphertexts are decrypted. A2 publishes the output of the
zero test as follows.
ZM (A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn ) =
{
TRUE if a zero is found in di for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
FALSE if no zero in di for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(1)
Fig. 1. Specialized zero test
Theorem 1. The specialized zero test is correct in the negatively-malicious model.
More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and there is one zero en-
crypted in c1, c2, . . . , cn, then
ZM ( A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn ) = TRUE.
Proof: As c′i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and the encryption algorithm is addi-
tive homomorphic, D2(c
′
i) = D2(c
ri
pi(i)) = riD2(cpi(i)) mod p2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Suppose D2(cj) = 0 where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then D2(c
′
pi−1(j)) = rpi−1(j) × D2(cj) =
rpi−1(j)×0 mod p2 = 0. So there is at least one zero inD2(c
′
1), D2(c
′
2), . . . , D2(c
′
n).
Therefore, ZM ( A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn ) = TRUE. 2
Theorem 2. The specialized zero test is sound in the negatively-malicious model.
More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and ZM ( A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cn ) =
TRUE, then there is at least one null ciphertext in c1, c2, . . . , cn.
Proof: As c′i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and the encryption algorithm is additive
homomorphic, D2(c
′
i) = D2(c
ri
pi(i)) = riD2(cpi(i)) mod p2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. As
ZM ( A1, A2 | c1, c2, . . . , cm ) = TRUE, there is at least one zero encrypted in
c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n. Suppose D2(c
′
j) = 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then rjD2(cpi(j)) = 0 mod p2.
As p2 is a prime and rj is chosen from Zp2−{0}, D2(cpi(j)) = 0. Therefore, there
is at least one null ciphertext in c1, c2, . . . , cn. 2
Theorem 3. The specialized zero test is private. More precisely, if A1 and A2 do
not collude, the only knowledge of either of them about D2(c1), D2(c2), . . . , D2(cn)
is the test result.
Proof: As A1 has no knowledge of the private key and the encryption algo-
rithm is semantically-secure, nothing about D2(c1), D2(c2), . . . , D2(cn) is re-
vealed to him if A2 does not help to decrypt any message. As A2 does not
collude with A1, A2 only tells A1 the test result, which is A1’s only knowledge
about D2(c1), D2(c2), . . . , D2(cn).
Although A2 has the private key, his knowledge is limited by the ciphertexts
sent to him. As A1 does not collude with him, only c
′
1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n are sent to A2. So
his only knowledge from the test is D2(c
′
1)||D2(c
′
2)|| . . . ||D2(c
′
n), which is called
his knowledge transcript. Suppose T1 and T2 are two knowledge transcripts from
two inputs with the same test result. Note that c′i = c
ri
pi(i), p2 is a prime and ri
is randomly chosen from Zp2 −{0} as A1 does not collude with A2. So D2(c
′
i) is
distributed uniformly in Zp2−{0} if D2(cpi(i)) 6= 0 or D2(c
′
i) = 0 if D2(cpi(i)) = 0.
So if A1 does not collude with A2, when the test result is TRUE, both T1 and
T2 are uniformly distributed in { T | T ∈ {Zp2}
n, T contains one 0}; when the
test result is FALSE, both T1 and T2 are uniformly distributed in (Zp2 − {0})
n.
As A2’s knowledge transcripts from any two inputs with the same test result are
indistinguishable from each other without A1’s collusion, no information about
the input is revealed to A2 except for the test result without A1’s collusion. 2
4 The New Range Test Protocol
In the new range test protocol, given a ciphertext c encrypted in the first en-
cryption system described in Section 2, the tester runs a two-party protocol
with the authority to examine whether D1(c) is in a certain interval range with-
out knowing or revealing D1(c). In this protocol there is a limitation about the
range size: no more than p1/5, which is of the same magnitude as the size of the
message space. As p1 is very large (e.g. 1024 bits long) in any practical encryp-
tion algorithm, the range is large enough for normal applications. For simplicity,
it is assumed that the range involved in the test is Zq where 5q ≤ p1. Note
that range test in any consecutive integer range in the message space with a
size no more than p1/5 can be easily reduced to a range test in a same-size
range starting from zero due to homomorphism of the encryption algorithm.
Three range test protocols are designed in this section based on a principle:
m ∈ Zq if and only if m%q = m, which can be tested by reducing it to multiple
simpler tests and repeatedly exploiting homomorphism of the employed encryp-
tion algorithms. Firstly, a correct but only partially sound test protocol in the
negatively-malicious model — basic range test — is described. Then a correct
and sound test protocol in the negatively-malicious model, called precise range
test, is designed based on two basic range tests. Finally, the precise range test
is upgraded to optimized precise range test through a cut-and-choose mecha-
nism, so that the tester can always get the correct result if he wants even in the
actively-malicious model.
4.1 Basic Range Test
The basic range test is an interactive protocol between two parties: the tester
and the authority. The tester is denoted as A1, who possesses a ciphertext c in
the first encryption system. The authority is denoted as A2, who possesses the
private keys of the two encryption systems. The basic range test protocol includes
three steps. In the first step, m, the message encrypted in c is randomly shared
between A1 and A2. Namely, A1 holds random integer m1, A2 holds random
integer m2 such that m = m1 + m2 mod p1. In the second step, A2 transmits
E2(m2) and E2(m2%q) to A1. In the third step, A1 and A2 perform a specialized
zero test, during which A1 provides some randomised and shuffled ciphertexts
and A2 decrypts them. The basic range test is denoted as BR ( A1, A2 | c ) and
described in Figure 2, such that
BR ( A1, A2 | c ) =
{
TRUE if (3) = TRUE
FALSE if (3) = FALSE
1. A1 randomly chooses m1 from Zp1 . He calculates c1 = E1(m1) and sends c2 =
c/c1 to A2.
2. (a) A2 calculates m2 = D1(c2).
(b) A2 calculates c
′
2 = E2(m2) and e2 = E2(m2%q) and sends them to A1.
3. (a) A1 calculates c
′
1 = E2(m1) and e1 = E2(m1%q).
(b) A1 needs to perform the following logic test with the help of A2:
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0
∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0 (2)
In logic expression (2), either all the five clauses are false or only one of them
is true. So the logic test of (2) can be implemented through a specialized zero
test:
ZM ( A1, A2 | e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q)) ) (3)
Fig. 2. Basic range test
Theorem 4. The basic range test is correct in the negatively-malicious model.
More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, the
specialized zero test in Formula (3) outputs TRUE.
Proof: Suppose D1(c) = m. As 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, m%q = m. There are two
important facts.
– As c = c1c2, m = m1 + m2 mod p1. So, either (1): m = m1 + m2 or (2):
m = m1 +m2 − p1.
– It is always true that either (a): (m1 + m2)%q = m1%q + m2%q or (b):
(m1 +m2)%q = m1%q +m2%q − q.
So the proof is given in four different cases by combining the two possibilities in
the first fact, (1) and (2), with the two possibilities in the second fact, (a) and
(b): (1a), (1b), (2a) and (2b).
– (1a): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = D2(e1e2/(E2(m1)E2(m2))) = D2(e1) +D2(e2)−
(D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2)) mod p2 = m1%q +m2%q − (m1 +m2) mod p2
According to Condition (1) and Condition (a),
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = (m1 +m2)%q −m mod p2 = m%q −m mod p2 = 0
– (1b): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = D2(e1e2/(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(q))) = D2(e1) +D2(e2)−
(D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2))− q mod p2 = m1%q +m2%q − (m1 +m2)− q mod p2
According to Condition (1) and Condition (b),
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = (m1+m2)%q+q−m−q mod p2 = m%q+q−m−q mod p2 = 0
– Proof of (2a) and (2b) is similaer to that of (1a) and (1b). Due to space limit,
it is provided in Appendix A. Proof in Appendix A illustrates that in the
cases of (2a) and (2b),D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0 orD2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q−
q))) = 0 or D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
In summary, it is always true that
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0
∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0 ∨D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
As ZM() is correct according to Theorem 1,
ZM ( A1, A2 | e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q)) ) = TRUE
2
Lemma 1. If
∑n
i=1(−1)
mixi = 0 mod p and
∑n
i=1 |xi| < p where mi = 0 or 1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then
∑n
i=1(−1)
mixi = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1 is very simple and is not present due to space limitation.
Theorem 5. The basic range test is partially sound in the negatively-malicious
model. More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and the specialized
zero test in Formula (3) outputs TRUE, then 0 ≤ D1(c) < 3q.
Proof: As ZM() is sound according to Theorem 2
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0 ∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0
∨ D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0 ∨D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0
when
ZM ( e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)), e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q)) ) = TRUE
In the following proof m1%q+m2%q is calculated with the help of homomorphic
property m1%q +m2%q = D2(e1) +D2(e2) = D2(e1e2) mod p2 and under the
condition of every clause in Equation (4). Each clause corresponds to a case in
the proof, while each case is divided into two sub-cases: either m = m1 +m2 or
m = m1 +m2 − p1.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0, then D2(e1e2) = D2(c
′
1c
′
2) = D2(E2(m1)E2(m2)) =
m1 +m2 mod p2.
• If m = m1 +m2, then
m1%q +m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1 +m2 mod p2 = m mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+|m2%q|+|m| < 2q+p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1 and p2 ≥ 3p1.
So according to Lemma 1, m1%q +m2%q = m. Therefore, m < 2q.
• If m = m1 +m2 − p1, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2 mod p2 = m+ p1 mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1| < 2q+ 2p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1 and
p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q + m2%q = m + p1, which
is impossible as m1%q + m2%q < 2q < p1 < m + p1. Therefore, it is
impossible that m = m1 +m2 − p1 when D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2)) = 0.
So, m < 2q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0, then
D2(e1e2) = D2(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)) = D2(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(q)) = m1+m2+q mod p2
• If m = m1 +m2, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+q mod p2 = m+q mod p2
Note that |m1%q| + |m2%q| + |m| + |q| < 3q + p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1 and
p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q+m2%q = m+ q. Therefore,
m < q.
• If m = m1 +m2 − p1, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+q mod p2 = m+p1+q mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1|+ |q| < 3q+2p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1
and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q +m2%q = m + p1 + q,
which is impossible as m1%q+m2%q < 2q < p1 < m+p1+q. Therefore,
it is impossible that m = m1+m2− p1 when D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q))) = 0.
So, m < q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0, then
D2(e1e2) = D2(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)) = D2(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q)) = m1+m2+p1%q mod p2
• If m = m1 +m2, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+p1%q mod p2 = m+p1%q mod p2
Note that |m1%q| + |m2%q| + |m| + |p1%q| < 3q + p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1
and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q +m2%q = m + p1%q.
Therefore, m < 2q.
• If m = m1 +m2 − p1, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+p1%q mod p2 = m+p1+p1%q mod p2
Note that |m1%q| + |m2%q| + |m| + |p1| + |p1%q| < 3q + 2p1 < p2 as
5q ≤ p1 and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q + m2%q =
m + p1 + p1%q, which is impossible as m1%q + m2%q < 2q < p1 <
m+ p1+ p1%q. Therefore, it is impossible that m = m1+m2− p1 when
D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = 0.
So, m < 2q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0, then
D2(e1e2) = D2(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q−q)) = D2(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q−q)) = m1+m2+p1%q−q mod p2
• If m = m1 +m2, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+p1%q−q mod p2 = m+p1%q−q mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1%q|+ |q| < 4q+p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1
and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q+m2%q = m+p1%q−q.
Therefore, m < 3q.
• If m = m1 +m2 − p1, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+p1%q−q mod p2 = m+p1+p1%q−q mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1|+ |p1%q|+ |q| < 4q + 2p1 < p2
as 5q ≤ p1 and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q +m2%q =
m+p1+p1%q−q, which is impossible as m1%q+m2%q < 2q < p1−q <
m + p1 + p1%q − q. Therefore, it is impossible that m = m1 +m2 − p1
when D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = 0.
So, m < 3q.
– If D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0, then
D2(e1e2) = D2(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q+q)) = D2(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q+q)) = m1+m2+p1%q+q mod p2
• If m = m1 +m2, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+p1%q+q mod p2 = m+p1%q+q mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1%q|+ |q| < 4q+p1 < p2 as 5q ≤ p1
and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q+m2%q = m+p1%q+q.
Therefore, m < q.
• If m = m1 +m2 − p1, then
m1%q+m2%q = D2(e1e2) mod p2 = m1+m2+p1%q+q mod p2 = m+p1+p1%q+q mod p2
Note that |m1%q|+ |m2%q|+ |m|+ |p1|+ |p1%q|+ |q| < 4q + 2p1 < p2
as 5q ≤ p1 and p2 ≥ 3p1. So according to Lemma 1, m1%q +m2%q =
m+ p1 + p1%q + q, which is impossible as m1%q +m2%q < 2q < p1 <
m + p1 + p1%q + q. Therefore, it is impossible that m = m1 +m2 − p1
when D2(e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = 0.
So, m < q.
In summary, it is always true that m < 3q. 2
Theorem 6. The basic range test is private. More precisely, if A1 and A2 do
not collude, the only knowledge of either of them about D1(c) is the test result.
Proof: A1’s total knowledge from the basic range test about D1(c) is the test
result as the employed encryption algorithms are semantically secure and only
A2 knows the private key. So A1’s only knowledge about D1(c) in the basic range
test is the test result if A2 does not collude with him.
Without A1’s collusion, A2’s total knowledge about D1(c) ism2 and T , which
is his knowledge transcript in the special zero test. So A2’s knowledge transcript
in the basic range test is m2||T . Theorem 3 illustrates that T reveals no infor-
mation except for the test result if A1 does not collude with A2. If A1 does not
collude with A2, m2 is uniformly distributed in Zp1 and independent of D1(c) or
T . So A2’s knowledge transcript in the basic range test reveals no information
about D1(c) except for the range test result if A1 does not collude with him.
Therefore, without A1’s collusion, A2’s only knowledge about D1(c) in the basic
range test is the test result. 2
The largest size of the range in the basic range test, q, is of the same magni-
tude as p1. The basic range test is efficient and has a constant cost independent
of the range size.
4.2 Precise Range Test
As partial soundness limits the application of the basic range test, it is upgraded
to precise range test, which is absolutely sound. More precisely, precise range
test outputs TRUE if and only if the encrypted message is in the range. The
precise range test of a ciphertext c in the first encryption system is denoted as
PR ( A1, A2 | c ), such that PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ D1(c) < q. The
precise range test of c is described in Figure 3, in which PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE
guarantees 0 ≤ D1(c) < 3q while BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q−1)/c ) = TRUE guarantees
D1(c) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} ∪ {p1 − 2q + 1, p1 − 2q + 2, . . . , p1}. The intersection of
the two ranges is Zq.
1. A1 prepares two basic range tests BR ( A1, A2 | c ) and BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q −
1)/c ).
2. A1 presents the two basic range tests to A2 in a random order.
3. A2 finishes the two basic range tests and tells A1 whether both basic range tests
output TRUE and no more information.
4.
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) =
{
TRUE if BR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE and
BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q − 1)/c ) = TRUE
FALSE otherwise
(4)
Fig. 3. Precise range test
Theorem 7. The precise range test is correct in the negatively-malicious model.
More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, then
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE.
Proof: As 0 ≤ D1(c) < q, according to Theorem 4, BR ( A1, A2 | c ) =
TRUE. As 0 ≤ D1(c) < q and the encryption algorithm is additive homo-
morphic, D1(E1(q − 1)/c) = q − 1 − D1(c) < q. So according to Theorem 4,
BR ( A1, A2 | (E1(q − 1)/c ) = TRUE. Therefore, PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE.
2
Theorem 8. The precise range test is absolutely sound in the negatively-malicious
model. More precisely, if nobody deviates from the protocol and PR ( A1, A2 | c ) =
TRUE, then 0 ≤ D1(c) < q.
Proof: BR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE and BR ( A1, A2 | (E1(q− 1)/c ) = TRUE as
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE. So, according to Theorem 5 and additive homomor-
phism of the encryption algorithm, 0 ≤ D1(c) < 3q and (q − 1 −D1(c))%p1 =
D1(E1(q − 1)/c) < 3q. The fact (q − 1−D1(c))%p1 < 3q implies 0 ≤ D1(c) < q
or D1(c) > p1 − 2q. As 5q ≤ p1, the fact D1(c) > p1 − 2q implies D1(c) ≥ 3q.
Therefore, D1(c) < 3q ∧ (D1(c) < q ∨ D1(c) ≥ 3q). Namely, 0 ≤ D1(c) < q.
2
As the employed encryption algorithms are semantically secure and A1 knows
no private key, his total knowledge about D1(c) is the test result if A2 does not
collude with him. So the precise range test is private to A1. More precisely, if
A2 does not collude with A1, A1’s only knowledge about D1(c) is the test result.
Note that the precise range test only employs two basic range tests, so it is not
completely private to A2. According to Theorem 6, A2’s only knowledge in the
precise range test are the results of the two basic range tests if A1 does not collude
with him. When the precise range test outputs TRUE, A2’s only knowledge is the
result of the precise range test without A1’s collusion as the precise range test
outputs TRUE if and only if both basic range tests output TRUE. However, when
the precise range test outputs FALSE, A2 knows whether −2q < D1(c) < 3q. If
one basic range test outputs FALSE and the other outputs TRUE, A2 knows that
−2q < D1(c) < 3q. Otherwise, A2 knows that 3q ≤ D1(c) ≤ p1−2q. So, complete
privacy is sacrificed in the precise range test to achieve absolute soundness in
the negatively-malicious model.
The largest size of the range in the precise range test, q, is of the same
magnitude as p1. The precise range test is efficient and has a constant cost
independent of the range size.
4.3 Optimized Precise Range Test
Correctness and soundness of the precise test cannot be guaranteed in the
actively-malicious model. A2 may deviate from the protocol and return a wrong
result to A1. Moreover, the precise test is not completely private to A2. In the
optimized precise range test A1 employs a cut-and-choose mechanism to verify
correctness of A2’s operation. This cut-and-choose mechanism can also achieve
complete privacy against A2. Precise range test of c is randomly mixed with
precise range tests of another random ciphertext. Only A1 knows which precise
range tests are performed on c, while A2 cannot distinguish the multiple tests.
If A2 attempts to cause an incorrect result, with the help of the cut-and-choose
mechanism A1 can detect A2’s cheating with an overwhelmingly large probabil-
ity. Moreover, although each precise test is not complete to A2, he cannot get
any information about D1(c) as he cannot distinguish tests of the two messages.
So privacy can be achieved against A2. The optimized precise range test proto-
col is described in Figure 4, which guarantees that the tester can always get the
correct test result if he wants even in the actively-malicious model.
1. A1 chooses a security parameter t and randomly divides set {1, 2, . . . , 2t} into
four subsets S1, S2, S3 and S4, such that [S1] + [S2] = [S3] + [S4] = t.
2. A1 randomly chooses m from Zq, calculates cˆ = E1(m) and E(0), a probabilistic
encryption of zero. Then he repeats for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2t.
– if i ∈ S1, A1 performs V Ci = PR ( A1, A2 | cˆ ) with A2;
– if i ∈ S2, A1 performs V Ci = PR ( A1, A2 | E1(0)/cˆ ) with A2;
– if i ∈ S3, A1 performs V Ci = PR ( A1, A2 | c ) with A2;
– if i ∈ S4, A1 performs V Ci = PR ( A1, A2 | E1(0)/c ) with A2.
3. A1 recognises A2’s honesty if and only if V Ci = TRUE for i ∈ S1, V Ci = FALSE
for i ∈ S2, V Ci is identical for i ∈ S3, V Ci is identical for i ∈ S4 and V Ci = ¬V Cj
for i ∈ S3 and j ∈ S4. If A2 is verified to be honest, A1 accepts V Ci with i ∈ S3
as the test result.
Fig. 4. Optimized precise range test
Theorem 9. The probability that a cheating A2 can pass the verification in the
optimized precise range test is no more than 1/
(
2t
t
)
.
Proof: Let vci denote the result of the i
th range test when A2 acts honestly. Let
CS = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2t, V Ci = vci}. No matter how A2 cheats, his malicious
behaviour can be classified into three cases: [CS] < t, t < [CS] < 2t or [CS] = t.
– If [CS] < t, V Ci = TRUE for i ∈ S1 and V Ci = FALSE for i ∈ S2 cannot be
satisfied. So A1 fails in the verification and A2 is found cheating.
– If t < [CS] < 2t, either incorrect precise range test exists in V Ci for i ∈
S1 ∪ S2 or both correct and incorrect precise range tests exist in V Ci for
i ∈ S3 ∪ S4. So A1 fails in the verification and A2 is found cheating.
– If [CS] = t, A2 can pass the verification if and only if CS = S1 ∪ S2. As
A1’s input in each precise range test is uniformly distributed, A2 cannot
tell any difference between the precise range tests. Moreover, S1, S2, S3,
S4 are randomly chosen and {vc1, vc2, . . . , vc2t} are uniformly distributed in
{TRUE,FALSE}2t. So A2 has no better method to find S1 ∪ S2 other than
random guess. Therefore, the probability that CS = S1 ∪ S2 is 1/
(
2t
t
)
.
Therefore, the only method for a cheating A2 to pass the verification is to set
CS = S1 ∪ S2, the success probability of which is 1/
(
2t
t
)
. 2
Theorem 9 indicates that the tester can get the correct and sound test result
in the optimized precise range test with an overwhelmingly large probability if he
wants even in the actively-malicious model. Privacy is improved in the optimized
precise range test. As A2 has no idea which precises range tests are performed
on c, he cannot get more information about c without A1’s collusion.
The maximum acceptable range is not changed after the test protocol is
optimized, so is still of the same magnitude as the message space. Although
the cut-and-choose mechanism reduces efficiency, cost of the optimized precise
range test is still independent of the range size. As the cutting factor t (which is
a small constant number like 20) is often much smaller than the range size, the
optimized precise range test is still an efficient solution. So the optimized precise
range test can satisfy all the desired properties of range test. Its advantages over
the existing related schemes in terms of the desired properties and efficiency are
demonstrated in Table 2. In table, cost of general and flexible range test instead
of more efficient range test with special encryption format for certain application
(costing O(log2 q) is listed.
5 Conclusion
A range test protocol is proposed, which can correctly and soundly test whether
a ciphertext contains a message in a certain interval range without revealing
the message. If the tester wants, he can get the correct test result with an
overwhelmingly large probability even in the actively-malicious model. Unlike the
existing related techniques, the new protocol is efficient, accepts large enough
range size and does not need a prover with knowledge of the message. Open
questions are left in regard to security in the actively-malicious model. Can
Table 2. Property comparison
Schemes Correctness Pri- Large Prover with know- Format of Cost
& Soundness -vacy range -ledge of the message the message
naive range test Yes Yes Yes needed any encryption O(q)
based on [9] or commitment
naive range test Yes Yes Yes not needed any additive homo- O(q)
based on [17] -morphic encryption
[2, 14, 6, 8] No Yes No needed commitment O(1)
[5] asymptotical Yes No needed certain commitment O(1)
optimized precise Yes Yes Yes not needed any additive homo- O(1)
range test -morphic encryption
correctness, soundness and privacy be achieved simultaneously in the actively-
malicious model? Is cut-and-choose inevitable for security of range test in the
actively-malicious model?
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A Proof of (2a) and (2b) in Theorem 4
Proof of (2a) and (2b) in Theorem 4 is as follows.
– (2a): According to conditions (2) and (a), m1%q+m2%q = (m1+m2)%q =
(m+ p1)%q.
So, (2a) can be divided into two sub-cases: either
(2ai): m1%q +m2%q = m%q + p1%q = m+ p1%q
or
(2aii): m1%q +m2%q = m%q + p1%q − q = m+ p1%q − q
• (2ai): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
and Condition (2) and Condition (2ai)
D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q)))
= D2(e1) +D2(e2) + p1 − (D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2))− p1%q mod p2
= m1%q +m2%q + p1 − (m1 +m2)− p1%q mod p2
= m+ p1%q + p1 − (m+ p1)− p1%q mod p2 = 0
• (2aii): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
and Condition (2) and Condition (2aii)
D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q))) = D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q − q)))
= D2(e1) +D2(e2) + p1 − (D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2))− (p1%q − q) mod p2
= m1%q +m2%q + p1 − (m1 +m2)− (p1%q − q) mod p2
= m+ p1%q − q + p1 − (m+ p1)− (p1%q − q) mod p2 = 0
– (2b): According to conditions (2) and (b), m1%q+m2%q = (m1+m2)%q+
q = (m+ p1)%q + q.
So, (2b) can be divided into two sub-cases: either
(2bi): m1%q +m2%q = m%q + p1%q = m+ p1%q + q
or
(2bii): m1%q +m2%q = m%q + p1%q − q = m+ p1%q
• (2bi): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
and Condition (2) and Condition (2bi)
D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q))) = D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q + q)))
= D2(e1) +D2(e2) + p1 − (D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2))− (p1%q + q) mod p2
= m1%q +m2%q + p1 − (m1 +m2)− (p1%q + q) mod p2
= m+ p1%q + q + p1 − (m+ p1)− (p1%q + q) mod p2 = 0
• (2bii): According to additive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm
and Condition (2) and Condition (2bii)
D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q))) = D2(e1e2E2(p1)/(E2(m1)E2(m2)E2(p1%q)))
= D2(e1) +D2(e2) + p1 − (D2(E2(m1)) +D2(E2(m2))− p1%q mod p2
= m1%q +m2%q + p1 − (m1 +m2)− p1%q mod p2
= m+ p1%q + p1 − (m+ p1)− p1%q mod p2 = 0
